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1 introduCtion
There	is	a	long	and	well-established	tradition	of	regarding	clusters,	industrial	districts,	or	
regional	innovation	systems	as	favored	locations	for	the	production	of	goods,	services,	
and	knowledge	(e.g.,	Audretsch	and	Feldman	(1996);	Bresnahan	et	al.	(2001)).	One	side	
argues	that	firms,	industries,	and	knowledge	are	becoming	more	and	more	footloose	and	
that	more	and	more	often	economic	activities	take	place	regardless	of	physical	distance.	
In	such	a	“weightless	economy”	(Quah	(1997);	Coyle	(1997)),	geography	is	treated	more	
or	less	as	an	historical	relict	(Ohmae	(1990);	Cairncross	(1997)).	Another	side	follows	
a	radically	different	line	of	thinking.	According	to	this	second	view,	spatial	proximity	
enhances	the	competitiveness	of	firms	by	facilitating	the	types	of	interrelations	and	inter-
actions	that	keep	organizations	in	place.	Proximity	fosters	the	processes	of	learning	and	
innovation	by	means	of	face-to-face	contacts,	“local	buzz”,	localized	capabilities,	and	the	
like	(e.g.,	Maskell	and	Malmberg	(1999);	Storper	and	Venables	(2004)).	According	to	
this	line	of	reasoning,	proximity	acts	as	a	basic	governance	mechanism,	because	it	reduces	
transaction	costs	by	establishing	helpful	local	codes	and	a	common	language.	In	a	similar	
vein,	Morgan	(2004)	warns	before	an	uncritical	acceptance	of	the	“death	of	geography”	
hypothesis,	since	knowledge	creation	still	depends	on	localized	interaction.	Thus,	a	specific	
geographical	configuration	of	economic	activity	is	regarded	as	being	crucial	in	shaping	the	
future	prospects	of	firms	and	industries	(compare	also	Zademach	(2005)).
Many	of	the	characteristics	of	the	knowledge-intensive	sectors	support	this	line	of	argu-
ment.	According	to	Leamer	and	Storper	(2001),	these	sectors,	although	they	permit	a	
decentralization	of	certain	routine	activities,	contribute	to	reinforcing	urban	concentration	
and	agglomeration.	Economic	success	in	the	knowledge-intensive	services	often	hinges	
on	the	creation	of	networks,	on	social	interaction,	locally	based	tacit	knowledge,	and	
personal	contacts,	factors	whose	genesis	depends	significantly	on	geographical	closeness	
(e.g.,	Rodríguez-Pose	and	Zademach	(2006)).	As	a	spatial	expression	of	this	phenomenon,	
the	emergence	of	strong	clustering	effects,	such	as	the	concentration	of	high-technology	
industries	in	California’s	Silicon	Valley,	the	Boston	and	Cambridge	areas	in	Massachusetts,	
and	in	India’s	Bangalore,	are	found	all	around	the	globe.	However,	discussions	about	the	
cluster	phenomenon	concentrate	on	only	a	handful	of	famous	clusters.	Several	locations	
that	start	off	with	favorable	conditions	did	not	take	off,	but	instead	sank	into	oblivion.	
The	concentration	on	the	few	successful	clusters	has	led	many	researchers	and	policy	
analysts	to	almost	a	“recipe”	approach:	Take	a	university,	locate	some	investors	around	it,	
initiate	entrepreneurship	lessons,	and	the	cluster	economies	will	start	off.	
In	this	paper	we	address	the	mechanisms	that	catapult	regions	to	extraordinary	perfor-
mance.	Building	on	Powell	et	al.’s	(2002)	work	on	the	biotechnology	industry	in	the	
U.S.,	in	which	they	explore	the	relationship	between	science	institutions,	venture	capital	
(VC),	and	biotechnology	firms,	and	identify	the	significance	of	“co-location	of	money	and	
ideas”,	we	use	the	case	of	the	biotechnology	industry	in	Germany	as	testing	ground.	
Our	analysis	proceeds	from	a	triad	of	conceptual	starting	points.	First,	we	investigate	
the	extent	to	which	the	clusters’	composition	(i.e.,	the	proportion	between	locally	based	
science	and	capital).	Second,	we	examine	their	external	linkages.	Third,	we	analyze	how	
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their	evolutionary	trajectories	correspond	to	their	respective	performance	levels.	That	is,	
we	do	not	only	put	emphasis	on	if,	but	also	on	how	clusters	change	over	time.	We	do	so	
by	looking	at	several	clusters	that	show	a	wide	heterogeneity	of	performance.	We	explore	
their	configuration,	their	degree	of	openness	and	internal	interconnectedness,	and	their	
structural	transformation	over	time.	
The	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	In	Section	2	we	develop	relevant	theoretical	considerations	
from	the	related	literature.	Section	3	briefly	sketches	the	characteristics	of	the	human	
biotechnology	industry.	In	Section	4	we	specify	the	methods	of	the	analysis	and	present	
our	empirical	results.	Section	5	concludes.	
2 literature review and theoretiCal Considerations
Studies	in	business	and	managerial	science	highlight	that	the	composition	of	a	cluster	
(Porter	(2000,	254)),	i.e.,	its	configuration	in	terms	of	private	firms,	public	institutions,	
governmental	regulations,	access	to	capital,	sectoral	specifications,	is	crucial	for	providing	
a	“cradle”	for	innovative	firms	(e.g.,	Feldman	(1994)).	For	nurturing	innovative	firms,	
science	and	capital	are	two	essential	factors.	Substantiating	this	statement,	Powell	et	al.	
(2002)	find	that	these	two	factors	are	strongly	concentrated	in	regional	U.S.	hotspots	of	
the	biotechnology	industry.	
Given	the	at	least	theoretically	unrestricted	ubiquity	of	capital,	we	might	question	the	basic	
rationales	behind	the	spatial	concentration	of	money	and	ideas.	Here,	a	key	rationale	relates	
to	the	fact	that	in	high-technology	industries,	innovations	are	the	result	of	an	accumulation	
and	a	special	combination	of	knowledge	in	the	basic	and	applied	sciences.	Public	research	
institutes	not	only	draw	scientists	and	engineers	to	a	region,	but	also	generate	knowledge	
that	nearby	firms	can	use.	In	her	case	study,	Saxenian	(1994)	reports	the	importance	of	
knowledge	transfer	between	Stanford	University	and	firms	located	in	Silicon	Valley.	Jaffe	
(1989)	shows	that	university	research	has	a	positive	impact	on	patenting	of	firms	in	the	
same	region.	Feldman	and	Florida	(1994)	note	that	the	clustering	of	innovations	is	related	
to	the	existence	of	R&D	institutions,	universities,	and	firms	in	a	particular	region	as	main	
centers	of	knowledge	creation.	By	the	same	token,	Prevezer	(1997)	finds	that	the	strength	
of	the	science	base	is	an	effective	magnet	for	the	entry	of	biotechnology	firms	in	the	U.S.	
(compare	Audretsch	and	Stephan	(1996);	Zucker	et	al.	(1998)).	
A	second	key	aspect	is	the	availability	of	venture	capital	(VC),	with	its	well-established	role	
in	the	development	of	high-technology	regions.	The	private	equity	market	has	grown	at	
an	explosive	rate	and	is	a	major	source	of	financing	for	start-up	firms.	Empirically,	Powell	
et	al.	(2002,	304)	find	a	strong	pattern	of	spatial	concentration	in	biotechnology	and	
VC,	and	state	“…	that	without	venture	capital	and	regional	agglomeration,	the	industry	
would	not	exist	in	the	form	that	it	does	today”.	The	role	of	locally	based	capital	might	
appear	astonishing	at	first	sight,	since	money,	particularly	compared	to	knowledge,	is	
highly	fungible	(Clark	and	Wójcik	(2005)).	Yet	most	venture	or	risk	capital	investors	not	
only	transfer	the	money,	they	also	provide	advice	and	contacts,	and	have	a	major	influ-
ence	in	management	decisions.	Being	able	to	combine	the	investment	process	with	such	
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influence	is	one	of	the	distinctive	features	of	venture	and	private	equity	capital.	Because	
problems	of	asymmetric	information,	agency,	and	uncertainty	are	a	function	of	physical	
distance	(Porteous	(1995)),	the	geographical	proximity	between	firms	seeking,	and	institu-
tions	providing,	finance	reduces	the	costs	and	efforts	of	monitoring	and	consulting.	Thus,	
a	spatially	concentrated	distribution	of	innovations	and	“smart	money”	may	be	seen	as	
distinctly	advantageous	compared	to	more	dispersed	systems	(Casamatta	(2003)).
Following	the	argument	of	Bathelt	et	al.	(2004),	the	co-location	of	money	and	ideas,	
however,	cannot	be	regarded	as	the	sole	source	of	a	regional	innovation	system’s	economic	
and	innovative	success.	Instead,	we	must	also	take	into	account	the	role	of	external	sources	
in	stimulating	growth	within	a	cluster.	In	other	words,	besides	local	“noise”	(Grabher	
(2002))	fed	by	the	interconnection	of	local	actors,	so	called	”trans-local	pipes”	pump	
knowledge	from	other	areas	of	the	nation	and	the	world	into	the	cluster.	These	pipes	
are	expected	to	be	relevant	for	cluster	success.	The	openness	of	the	cluster	is	particularly	
important	when	the	market	for	the	innovation	is	global.	Ties	to	market	actors	worldwide	
keep	the	cluster	up	to	date	and	provide	relations	to	current	and	potential	collaborators	in	
research	and	commercialization	(Bresnahan	et	al.	(2001);	Zeller	(2001)).	
However,	obtaining	access	to	external	information	and	partners	over	pipes	often	requires	
accepting	high	uncertainty	and	undertaking	significant	investment.	Here,	some	institu-
tions	(e.g.,	government	and	investors)	can	play	a	decisive	role,	first	by	being	the	boundary	
spanners	that	build	the	bridge	between	clusters	and	non-local	actors	over	which	informa-
tion	flows	to	the	cluster,	and	second	by	bringing	to	the	cluster	their	experience	from	oper-
ating	in	other	parts	of	the	world.	Apart	from	providing	money,	VC	firms	play	a	hands-on	
role	in	the	running	of	the	young	companies	and	provide	relevant	sources	of	manage-
ment	expertise.	Although	it	is	generally	acknowledged	that	these	processes	of	moni-
toring,	advising,	and	managing	are	much	more	easily	accomplished	when	the	young	firm	
is	located	nearby,	the	mere	focus	on	the	local	arena	runs	also	the	distinct	risk	of	lock-in	
effects	(e.g.,	Grabher	(1993)).	To	avoid	such	lock-ins,	“consciously	open	network	relations	
for	the	influx	of	external	information	as	well	as	maintaining	a	certain	amount	of	distrust	
with	respect	to	traditional	solutions	are	important”	(Bathelt	et	al.	(2004,	42)).	The	same	
mechanism	holds	for	the	firm	level.	Several	studies	show	that	biotechnology	firms	involved	
in	an	intense	collaboration	network	bring	products	to	the	market	faster	(Rothaermel	and	
Deeds	(2004)),	attract	more	capital	(Stuart	et	al.	(1999)),	and	are	more	likely	to	restruc-
ture	in	times	of	change	(Häussler	(2007)).
Third,	we	regard	clusters	as	moving	targets	whose	composition	and	interconnectivity	
evolve	over	time.	Past	cluster	studies	(at	least	those	that	compare	multiple	clusters)	rarely	
consider	the	dynamics	and	trajectories	of	clusters	as	being	relevant	to	their	performance.	
However,	the	dynamic	lens	is	gaining	momentum	with	the	accelerated	pace	of	techno-
logical	innovations	and	increased	competition.	Changes	in	the	composition	of	clusters	
can	be	understood	as	an	evolutionary	path.	These	paths	show	the	development	of	cluster	
characteristics,	such	as	growth	in	number	of	firms,	performance	(e.g.,	patents,	products),	
and	structure	(e.g.,	science	and	capital)	over	certain	time	spans.	Based	on	the	assumption	
that	these	paths	are	not	fully	dependent	on	their	earlier	positions,	the	actors	in	a	cluster	
or	third	parties	(e.g.,	government)	can	influence	the	paths.	
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The	composition	of	clusters	over	time	may	remain	stable,	or	may	show	a	trend	towards	
greater	convergence	(respectively	divergence).	Several	researchers	provide	convincing	argu-
ments	(e.g.,	imitation	is	inherent	in	human	nature,	people	exchange	ideas,	learn	from	each	
other,	and	may	be	influenced	by	the	same	advisors)	which	favor	the	convergence	hypoth-
esis	(DiMaggio	and	Powell	(1983);	Häussler	and	Harhoff	(2007)).	Yet,	this	hypothesis	has	
hardly	ever	been	tested	for	cluster	evolution.	To	our	best	knowledge,	the	most	closely	related	
study	is	Owen-Smith	and	Powell’s	(2006)	comparative	investigation	of	the	Boston	and	San	
Francisco	Bay	Area	clusters.	By	examining	three	types	of	ties	–	those	between	biotechnology	
firms,	between	biotechnology	firms	and	investors,	and	between	biotechnology	firms	and	
public	research	organizations	–	the	authors	show	that	the	clusters	network	structure	shows	
strong	differences	in	1994	but	resembles	in	the	year	1999.	Broad	similarities	between	clus-
ters	today	“…can	be	outcome	of	divergent	patterns	of	development”	(p.	3).	However,	the	
authors	focus	only	on	two	very	successful	clusters;	hence,	we	cannot	derive	any	general	
conclusion	between	evolutionary	paths	and	cluster	performance.	
3 human BioteChnology industry as testing ground 
The	biotechnology	industry	was	born	when	recombinant	DNA	technology	and	molec-
ular	genetics	opened	an	innovative	method	of	research.	In	this	industry,	it	is	widely	recog-
nized	that	firms	tend	to	cluster	for	the	following	reasons.	First,	the	biotechnology	industry	
exemplifies	many	of	the	characteristics	of	all	science-based	sectors.	Firms	must	be	at	the	
forefront	of	science	to	be	successful	market	actors.	Thus,	biotechnology	firms	are	often	
linked	to	universities	and	public	research	institutes	that	conduct	basic	and	applied	science.	
Second,	biotechnology	is	likely	to	profit	from	local	economies	because	much	of	its	knowl-
edge	is	tacit	and	uncodifiable	(Aharonson	and	Feldman	(2004,	3)).	Third,	by	its	very	
nature,	the	R&D	process	is	highly	uncertain	and	complex	(Häussler	(2005)).	On	average,	
during	the	ten	to	15	years	it	takes	to	develop	a	drug	and	bring	it	to	market,	the	10,000	
compounds	that	enter	the	process	are	narrowed	down	to	one	single	marketable	drug.	
Fourth,	biotechnology	firms	are	dependent	on	the	capital	market.	Developing	pharma-
ceutical	products	is	highly	capital	intensive.	On	average,	the	costs	to	develop	a	new	drug	
amount	to	$802M	(DiMasi	et	al.	(2003)).	Thus,	the	availability	of	capital	is	an	important	
ingredient	for	developing	a	seedbed	for	biotechnology	firms.
In	Germany,	there	were	very	few	signs	of	a	biotechnology	industry	when	Interferon™,	the	
first	drug	developed	by	a	biotechnology	firm,	entered	the	market	in	1986.	The	amend-
ment	of	the	Genetic	Engineering	Act	in	1993	significantly	improved	the	administrative	and	
legal	environment	for	biotechnological	research,	raising	hope	for	a	biotechnology	industry	
in	Germany.	The	initial	spark	was	the	BioRegio	competition	in	1995	launched	by	the	
German	Federal	Ministry	of	Education	and	Research,	which	aimed	to	boost	the	founda-
tions	of	biotechnology	firms	around	its	winner	regions.	Entrepreneurs	in	life	sciences	were	
motivated	by	public	policy	and	enormous	government	subsidies	to	form	ventures	around	
those	regions.	
The	German	biotechnology	regions	provide	an	excellent	environment	for	investigating	the	
structure	and	evolutionary	paths	of	biotech	clusters.	We	begin	our	observation	period	in	
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1996	in	order	to	capture	the	effect	of	the	BioRegio	competition,	the	early	steps	of	biotech-
nology	firm	foundation	in	Germany,	and	to	track	the	development	of	biotechnology	firms,	
science	institutions	and	investors	in	biotechnology.	
4 sPeCifiCation of analysis and emPiriCal results 
Before	focus	is	shifted	on	the	empirical	results	and	the	examination	of	the	extent	to	which	
the	given	theoretical	approaches	help	to	explain	the	performance	of	German	biotech	clus-
ters,	we	briefly	describe	the	database	and	discuss	our	methods.	
4.1	Data,MethoDs	anD	Cluster	IDentIfICatIon
Our	main	source	for	our	investigation	is	a	compilation	of	the	annual	BioCom	listing	of	
biotechnology	firms,	public	institutes	that	perform	biotechnology	research,	and	inves-
tors	in	biotechnology	that	operated	in	Germany	between	1996	and	2003.	Further	direc-
tories,	e.g.	Dechema	or	the	Dufa-Index	were	used	to	complement	the	database.	We	also	
compiled	separate	data	on	risk/venture	capitalists	investing	in	biotechnology	firms	by	
using	information	from	the	magazines	Venture	Capital,	Going	Public	and	Transcript,	the	
Venture	Economics	database,	the	VC	Facts	database,	and	from	company	press	releases	and	
announcements	from	the	German	Private	Equity	and	Venture	Capital	Association.
To	identify	biotech	clusters,	the	literature	provides	a	variety	of	different	approaches.	They	
all	offer	more	or	less	identical	results,	so	that	the	“hot	spots”	of	German	biotech	are	well	
established	(e.g.,	Ernst	&	Young	(2001);	BioCom	(2004,	13)).	On	basis	of	our	data	
record,	these	results	are	again	substantiated.	In	our	study,	we	identify	clusters	by	using	
the	relative	Euclidean	distances	between	biotechnology	firms,	research	institutes,	and	VC	
investors	in	biotechnology.	Applying	a	two-step	approach,	we	first	selected	the	raw	cluster	
data	from	a	map	and	then	refined	our	selections	analytically.	Each	firm’s,	each	research	
institute’s,	and	each	VC	investor’s	postal	address	was	therefore	converted	into	latitude	and	
longitude	measurements.	Subsequently,	we	mapped	the	objects	with	help	of	MapInfo	(a	
software	package	that	offers	a	tool	to	identify	clusters	according	to	a	selectable	radius);	
clusters	were	specified	as	concentrations	of	an	overall	minimum	of	40	objects,	with	the	
individual	lower	thresholds	for	firms,	research	institutes,	and	investors	being	20,	ten	and	
two,	respectively2.	A	clear	leap	in	the	quadratic	distances	from	the	cluster	objects	to	the	
cluster	center	determines	the	borders	of	the	clusters.	
For	each	year	during	the	period	of	investigation,	this	approach	resulted	in	nine	clusters	
in	which	a	significant	share	of	German	biotechnology	activities	takes	place	in	a	spatially	
concentrated	area.	All	nine	regions	are	compact	areas	with	radii	ranging	from	16.9	km	
(Hanover)	to	60.7	km	(Ruhr	area).	Beside	these	two	areas,	Hamburg,	Berlin,	Göttingen,	
1	 BioCom	is	the	largest	and	most	historical	independently	operating	directory	for	biotechnology	in	Germany.	
2	 For	a	similar	mean	of	cluster	demarcation,	see	Aharonson	et	al.	(2004).	
3	 Göttingen	fulfills	the	given	classification	requirements	only	from	1999	onwards.
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the	Rhine/Main	area,	and	Heidelberg,	as	well	as	Stuttgart	and	Munich,	come	to	the	fore	
as	the	key	nodes	in	German	biotechnology.	These	areas	all	explicitly	define	themselves	as	
a	biotech	region;	the	identification	and	interplay	of	the	cluster	participants	is	expressed,	
e.g.,	in	an	own	logo	and	webpage	that	provides	information	on	local	firms,	events,	news-
letters,	and	regular	meetings.	In	all	nine	clusters,	one	institution	was	established	(such	
as	Bio-M	and	BIOPRO	for	Munich	and	Stuttgart,	respectively)	that	fosters	and	bundles	
regional	activities.	
Despite	these	common	characteristics,	the	evolution	of	the	nine	clusters	varies	signifi-
cantly	over	time.	Figures 1	and	2	indicate	their	differing	levels	of	performance	measured	
by	the	growth	of	the	number	of	biotechnology	firms	located	in	each	of	the	regions.	
Figure 1	depicts	firm	growth	in	absolute	terms.	Figure 2	refers	to	an	index	(setting	1996	
to	100).	
Figure 1: Performance of biotech clusters in Germany, 1996-2003 (measured in  
 absolute number of firms per cluster) 
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4	 We	realize	that	the	sheer	number	of	biotech	firms	represents	a	limited	indicator	to	measure	a	cluster’s	overall	
performance.	Therefore,	we	have	controlled	for	the	number	of	employees	per	firm	in	all	clusters	on	the	one	
hand,	and	the	varying	main	fields	of	activity	(e.g.,	mainly	product	firms	vs.	supplier	and	service	firms)	on	the	
other.	So	far,	we	have	not	been	able	to	observe	any	significant	deviations	compared	to	the	chosen	indicator.	
Nonetheless,	we	consider	this	an	important	field	for	future	investigation.
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Figure 2: Indexed performance of German biotech clusters, 1996-2003 (measured  
 in relative firm growth per cluster; 1996 = 100)
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In	both	figures,	Munich	and	the	Ruhr	area	appear	to	outperform	the	other	areas,	as	does	Berlin,	
which	shows	in	absolute	terms	the	highest	number	of	firms	over	the	whole	period	of	obser-
vation.	Göttingen,	Hanover,	Hamburg,	and	the	Rhine/Main	area	around	Frankfurt	display	
a	below-average	number	of	firms.	To	examine	how	the	performance	heterogeneity	could	be	
explained	by	the	theoretical	considerations,	we	use	a	three-step	investigation.	The	first	classi-
fies	the	different	clusters	according	to	their	composition.	Here,	the	number	of	biotech	firms	
is	compared	to	the	number	of	investors	on	the	one	hand,	and	to	the	number	of	basic	science	
institutions	on	the	other.	By	this	means,	we	identify	three	different	general	cluster	types:	the	
well-balanced	ones,	the	basic-science-driven	ones,	and	the	VC/investor-dominated	ones.	
The	second	step	examines	a	cluster’s	openness	and	interconnection	with	the	other	clusters	
and	also	with	firms	located	outside	these	key	nodes.	For	this	purpose,	we	use	the	amount	of	
VC	cash-flows	and	the	number	of	VC	investors	that	operated	within	and	between	the	cluster	
objects,	i.e.,	intra-	vs.	intercluster	VC	flows.	In	addition,	this	step	of	our	analysis	also	covers	
the	flows	of	public	money	and	governmental	subsidies,	which	must	be	regarded	as	important	
impulse	transmitters	that	have	a	significant	impact	on	a	cluster’s	formation	and	evolution.	
In	the	third	step,	we	investigate	the	cluster’s	evolutionary	trajectories	by	using	an	index	that	
shows	how	a	clusters	composition	changes	over	the	period	of	investigation.	The	composition	
comprises	two	variables:	the	number	of	risk	capital	investors	and	number	of	basic	research	
institutes.	We	calculate	the	Cluster	Composition	Index,	CC-I,	according	to	the	following	
formula:
CC-I =  
ƩBSi,t/ƩVCi,t  ____________  ƩBSGer,t/ƩVCGer,t
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BS	represents	the	absolute	number	of	basic	science	institutions,	VC	the	number	of	risk	
capital	investors	or	venture	capitalists; t denotes	the	year	of	investigation;	i stands	for	
the	included	clusters;	and	Ger	corresponds	to	the	whole	of	Germany,	i.e.,	the	respective	
national	total.	
Regarding	the	direction	of	change,	we	differentiate	between	clusters	that	shift	towards	
a	more	balanced	a	structure	and	clusters	that	move	towards	a	structure	that	strengthens	
their	specific	idiosyncrasies.	The	former	direction	points	to	convergence,	the	latter	to	
divergence.	
4.2	eMpIrICal	results	I:	struCture	anD	openness
For	the	nine	clusters,	Figure 3	shows	the	total	number	of	research	institutes	as	a	proxy	for	
level	of	basic	science	on	the	abscissa,	the	total	of	VC	investors	as	a	measure	for	the	amount	
of	locally	available	risk	capital	on	the	ordinate,	and	the	number	of	biotechnology	firms	via	
the	size	of	the	respective	“bubble”	with	the	total	number	in	parentheses.	The	plot	suggests	
a	distinct	degree	of	heterogeneity	in	the	composition	of	clusters;	however,	some	of	them	
are	obviously	featured	by	rather	similar	characteristics.	
Figure 3: Structural composition of German biotech clusters, 2003 (in absolute numbers)
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5	 Via	the	standardization	by	the	national	average,	the	index	controls	for	the	overall	proportion	of	investors	and	
basic	science	institutions	in	the	German	biotechnology	sector	and	thus	covers	the	extent	to	which	a	cluster	is	
relatively	dominated	either	by	‘ideas’	or	‘money’.	An	index	below	one	indicates	that	the	cluster	hosts	a	larger	
proportion	of	investors	compared	to	the	national	average.	An	index	greater	than	one	indicates	that	the	cluster	
includes	relatively	more	science	institutions.
c. häuSSler/h.-M. ZadeMach
  
  
  
         
 270 SBr 59  July 2007  261-281
As	the	most	important	locations	of	biotech	production	in	Germany	(compare	also	Figure 1,	
again),	Munich	and	the	Ruhr	area	display	the	greatest	quantity	of	both	science	and	capital.	
Likewise,	the	indexed	rate	of	the	firm	growth	(Figure 2)	is	highest	in	these	two	locations.	
In	comparison,	Hamburg,	Hanover,	Stuttgart,	Heidelberg,	and	Göttingen	have	small	
numbers	of	research	institutes	and	investors.	The	Rhine/Main	area,	with	its	financial	
center	at	Frankfurt,	represents	the	second	largest	concentration	of	investors,	but	shows	
the	smallest	number	of	science	institutions.	The	direct	opposite	is	true	for	the	capital	city	
Berlin,	which	has	a	large	number	of	science	institutes	but	relatively	few	investors.	
The	exercise	of	depicting	the	cluster’s	composition	in	absolute	terms	gives	a	first	idea	of	
the	varying	types	–	“finance-driven”	compared	to	more	“science-dominated”	compared	to	
“well-balanced”	clusters	–	that	can	be	distinguished	in	the	German	biotechnology	land-
scape.	The	Rhine/Main	area	around	Frankfurt	clearly	represents	the	money-led	player.	
Berlin,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Göttingen,	with	Stuttgart	as	the	borderline	case,	compose	
the	contrasting	group	of	the	science-driven	clusters	(albeit	in	the	case	of	the	latter	two,	the	
crucial	factor	is	a	low	number	of	investors	rather	than	an	extraordinary	high	number	of	
science	institutions).	The	remaining	clusters	of	Munich,	the	Ruhr	area,	Hamburg,	Heidel-
berg	and	Hanover	are,	at	least	at	the	end	of	the	period	of	investigation,	best	captured	as	
well-balanced	in	terms	of	their	financial	and	scientific	make-up.
When	we	contrast	the	varying	cluster	types	with	their	performance,	we	cannot	identify	
one	dominant	cluster	type	as	particularly	successful.	The	well-balanced	and	the	science-
dominated	clusters	provide	both	above	and	below	average	performers	alike.	Similarly,	
Hanover,	Göttingen,	and	the	Rhine/Main	area	show	a	fairly	dissatisfying	performance,	
although	they	display	entirely	differing	structural	compositions.	When	we	focus	only	
on	the	three	top	performing	clusters	–	Munich,	Berlin,	and	the	Ruhr	area	–	we	find	
that	Munich	and	the	Ruhr	area	belong	to	the	well-balanced	type,	but	shine	out	within	
this	group	by	showing	a	particularly	large	number	of	research	institutes	and	investors.	
The	somewhat	unbalanced	Berlin	area	hosts	a	large	number	of	research	institutes,	but	
locates	only	few	investors.	As	an	intermediate	result,	we	note	that	no	cluster	type	becomes	
apparent	as	clearly	superior,	and	that	a	cluster’s	general	composition	adds	only	a	little	to	
explain	its	economic	success.	
In	light	of	this	finding,	we	now	turn	to	the	debate	that	stresses	the	importance	of	inter-
connectivity	and	external	linkages.	As	far	data	availability	allows,	Table 1	reports	the	mean	
number	of	collaborations	with	nonprofit	organizations	(i.e.,	universities	and	research	orga-
nizations)	and	for-profit	firms	for	all	biotechnology	firms	located	in	our	nine	clusters6.	
This	distinction	reveals	information	on	the	science	versus	technology	orientation	of	the	
firms	in	the	clusters.	Companies	that	collaborate	extensively	with	for-profit	firms	are	
presumably	more	oriented	toward	commercialization,	whereas	firms	that	collaborate	with	
academic	or	nonacademic	research	organizations	are	more	science	intense	and	yet	more	
distant	from	actually	marketing	their	inventions.	This	exercise	shows	different	levels	of	
interconnectivity	as	well	as	distinct	patterns	of	specialization.	
6	 Note	that	only	about	half	of	the	biotechnology	firms	in	the	BioCom	yearbooks	list	their	collaborations.	
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Table 1: Interorganisational collaborations of biotechnology firms, 2003
Interorganisational 
collaborations
    Mean number of collaborations with
Mean number per firm non profit organisations for profit organisations
Munich 5.9 2.0 (29) 3.9 (28)
hamburg 5.2 0.7 (9) 4.5 (9)
Berlin 5.0 2.1 (30) 2.9 (30)
ruhr area 4.2 2.1 (17) 2.1 (17)
hanover 4.0 1.0 (3) 3.0 (4)
Stuttgart 3.9 1.6 (7) 2.3 (7)
rhine/Main 3.8 1.3 (4) 2.5 (4)
heidelberg 3.6 2.4 (10) 1.2 (9)
göttingen 3.3 1.3 (4) 2.0 (4)
note: number of observations in parentheses; based on data from Biocom (2003)
Among	the	group	of	the	extensive	collaborators	are	firms	located	in	the	three	outper-
forming	clusters	–	Munich,	Berlin,	Ruhr	area	–	and	in	the	low-performing	Hamburg	
cluster.	Hamburg	is	gaining	attention	as	the	cluster	with	the	largest	number	of	for-profit	
firms.	This	fact	is	presumably	explained	by	a	relative	large	proportion	of	service	firms.	In	
contrast,	Heidelberg,	with	the	largest	number	of	pure	product	development	firms,	shows	
the	largest	number	of	collaborations	with	nonprofit	organizations,	but	a	low	number	
of	inter-firm	collaborations.	Conspicuously,	besides	their	high	overall	interconnectivity,	
not	one	of	the	outperforming	clusters	shows	a	strong	specialization	in	either	science-	or	
technology-dominated	collaborations.	As	data	availability	unfortunately	does	not	allow	
us	to	control	for	the	locational	dimension	of	collaboration,	i.e.,	whether	the	partner	
firm	is	located	within	or	outside	the	cluster,	we	cannot	draw	any	systematic	conclusion	
concerning	the	inter-	and	intracluster	connectivity.	
The	inflow	of	risk	capital	within	and	to	a	cluster	is	the	second	aspect	of	interconnectivity	
we	shed	light	on.	For	the	nine	clusters	as	well	as	the	remaining	part	of	the	country,	i.e.,	the	
firms	outside	the	clusters,	Table 2	provides	an	overview	that	distinguishes	between	VC	cash	
flows	on	the	one	hand	and	the	number	of	deals	on	the	other.	First,	the	table	shows	that	in	
absolute	terms	regardless	of	whether	it	came	from	inside	or	outside	the	greatest	amount	of	
smart	money	went	in	and	to	Munich.	Over	the	period	of	investigation,	more	than	€1.1	
billion	were	invested	here	in	415	single	deals.	In	proportion	to	the	total	national	VC	flows	
between	clusters	(column	5)	and	those	coming	from	outside	of	that	cluster	(column	6),	in	
terms	of	total	cash	flows	as	well	as	number	of	transactions,	these	investments	account	for	
close	to	50%	of	the	total.	That	is,	nearly	half	of	all	intra-cluster	financed	projects	in	the	
German	biotechnology	industry	headed	for	Munich.	Other	areas	that	succeed,	although	to	
a	smaller	extent,	in	attracting	money	are	the	Ruhr	area,	Berlin,	and	Heidelberg,	attracting	
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14%,	13%,	and	11%,	respectively,	from	all	outside	VC	flows,	i.e.,	the	total	national	amount	
of	VC	less	the	capital	circulated	within	the	clusters	themselves	(column	6).	Each	of	the	
remaining	clusters	attracts	only	below	2%	of	total	outside	flows.
Table 2: VC flows and deals, 1996-2003
VC Cash flow VC Deals
Total 
cash-
flow 
(Mio.€)
Intra-  
cluster 
cash-
flow 
(Mio €)
National 
outside 
flows  
(Mio €)
Outside 
flows 
from 
abroad 
(Mio_€)
Share 
of nat. 
intra 
flows 
(%)
Share 
of nat. 
outside 
flows 
(%)
Total 
no. 
of VC 
deals
No. of 
intra 
cluster 
deals
No. of 
out-
side 
cluster 
deals 
(nat.)
No. of 
deals 
from 
abroad 
Share 
of 
nat. 
intra 
deals 
(%)
Share 
of nat. 
outside 
deals 
(%)
Receiver (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Munich 1166.9 238.5 733.2 195.2 47.1 54.0 415 120 230 65 36.5 49.0
ruhr area 333.8 42.8 184.2 106.8 8.4 13.6 89 17 56 16 5.2 11.9
heidelberg 286.3 55.9 152.3 78.1 11.0 11.2 84 21 44 19 6.4 9.4
Berlin 244.7 45.8 171.3 33.2 9.0 12.6 114 30 74 13 9.1 15.8
hamburg 43.8 15.6 9.3 18.9 3.1 0.7 9 4 4 1 1.2 0.9
göttingen 42.4 6.2 31.8 4.4 1.2 2.3 17 8 8 1 2.4 1.7
Stuttgart 35.3 14.9 19.3 1.2 2.9 1.4 33 20 12 1 6.1 2.6
hanover 15.0 3.8 9.4 1.9 0.7 0.7 12 4 7 1 1.2 1.5
rhine/Main 3.5 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 9 3 4 2 0.9 0.9
outside 179.4 81.9 45.8 51.7 - 3,4 150 102 30 18 - 6.4
Total 2351,2 506,8 1357,8 492,2 100 100 932 329 469 137 100 100
notes:  - investments from the state owned bank  ‘technologiebeteiligungsgesellschaft’  are not included;- 
 - in case of joint transactions by two or more syndicating venture capitalists one and the same transaction is repeat- 
 edly counted
These	findings	underline	the	extraordinary	role	played	by	the	Bavarian	capital	city	and	
certainly	add	to	explain	the	take-off	of	its	biotech	industry.	Yet	apart	from	this	insight,	
the	external	linkages	to	investors	seem	to	be	less	indicative	in	predicting	cluster	success.	
In	particular,	if	we	compare	the	intra-cluster	flows	(column	2)	to	the	outside-cluster	flows	
(column	3),	we	see	that	the	ones	which	show	a	relatively	high	proportion	of	external	flows	
are	not	necessarily	the	industry	outperformers.	For	example,	Hanover	and	Heidelberg	
display	the	same	intra-	to	outside-cluster	flows	ratio	of	about	one	to	three	as	Munich;	and	
the	low	performer	Göttingen	attracts	among	the	greatest	relative	proportion	of	outside	
flows,	namely	nearly	six	times	the	amount	spent	within	the	cluster.	
7	 To	some	extent,	Göttingen’s	underperformance	concerning	this	matter	can	also	be	attributed	to	limited	data	
availability.
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Figure 4: VC cash flows within and between German biotech clusters, 1996-2000  
 and 2001-2003 compared
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To	shed	further	light	on	this	aspect,	Figure 4	displays	in	dynamic	perspective	the	accumu-
lated	cash	flows	of	VC	funding	within	and	between	the	nine	German	biotech	clusters.	The	
two	maps	distinguish	between	the	time	span	1996	to	2000,	i.e.,	from	the	beginning	of	our	
observations	up	to	the	crash	of	the	New	Economy,	and	the	period	2001	to	2003.
Three	important	findings	emerge	from	the	temporally	differentiated	analysis.	First,	
notwithstanding	the	overall	cooling	of	VC	dynamism,	the	total	amount	of	investments	
during	the	second	period	exceeds	that	of	the	first.	The	key	driver	of	this	development	is	
a	significant	increase	in	the	mean	amount	invested	(investments	between	1996	and	2000	
averaged	€1.88	million,	from	2001	onwards	€2.65	million),	a	development	which	in	
essence	is	due	to	the	growing	maturity	of	the	receptors,	who	shift,	if	successful,	from	their	
initial	seed	and	start-up	stages	towards	a	more	capital-intense	expansion	stage.	Second,	
we	observe	that	not	only	has	the	overall	level	of	VC	investments	increased,	but	also	the	
number	of	linkages	between	the	clusters.	With	the	exception	of	Hamburg,	where	the	
involvement	with	the	interregional	VC	network	remained	almost	entirely	unchanged,	
all	clusters	increased	their	links	to	external	sources	of	money	(and	managerial	knowl-
edge)	on	the	one	hand	and	their	investments	into	proximately	located	firms	on	the	other.	
Most	notably,	this	is	the	case	in	Berlin	and	Stuttgart,	where	we	see	an	increase	of	six	to	
11	and	two	to	seven	external	links,	respectively.	Third	and	finally,	concerning	the	share	
of	intra-regional	investments,	a	pretty	variegated	picture	comes	into	view:	Although	the	
majority	of	our	clusters	exhibit	a	relatively	stable	proportion	of	capital	invested	within	
them,	internal	funding	decreased	in	Hamburg	and	the	Rhine/Main	area.	In	contrast,	
Heidelberg	experienced	above-average	growth	concerning	this	matter.	
Taken	together,	the	result	of	the	VC	flows	mapping	exercise	is	ambiguous	if	matched	
with	the	performance	of	our	clusters.	Although	all	of	the	three	outperforming	clusters	–	
Munich,	Berlin,	and	the	Ruhr	area	–	are	intensifying	their	links	to	provide	finance	to	and	
receive	capital	from	other	clusters,	their	respective	configurations	are	relatively	dissimilar,	
with	Berlin	emerging	as	one	of	the	receiver	clusters	but	with	Munich	finding	itself	within	
a	tight	financing	net.	That	is,	internal	interconnection	as	well	as	external	linkages	can	
both	be	regarded	as	important	general	cluster	features	that	contribute	to	the	areas’	overall	
success,	but	add	very	little	to	explaining	their	differing	performance	levels.
Turning,	finally,	to	public	money	and	governmental	grants	(compare	Table A1	in	the	
appendix),	which,	apart	from	triggering	significant	economic	stimuli,	are	also	to	be	seen	as	
important	extra-cluster	linkages	and	potential	sources	of	new	ideas	and	knowledge.	Again,	
and	barely	astonishing,	Munich,	Berlin,	and	the	Ruhr	area	receive	by	far	the	greatest	
slice	of	the	cake.	However,	this	finding	must	be	put	into	the	perspective	of	the	level	of	
economic	activity	in	these	localities	taken	as	a	whole.	Accounting	thus	for	the	number	of	
firms	as	well	as	for	the	overall	minor	level	of	coverage	(take,	e.g.,	the	€24	million	govern-
mental	means	compared	to	the	€1.1	billion	of	VC	flowing	into	Munich),	again,	only	
8	 The	rationale	for	using	these	two	time	spans	is	straightforward	and	intuitive.	Although	the	1990s	saw	an	extre-
mely	dynamic	development	of	public	equity	markets	in	Germany,	including	the	establishment	of	Neuer	Markt	
in	1997,	 the	bursting	of	 the	New	Economy	bubble	 in	2000-01	 significantly	 slowed	 this	dynamic	develop-
ment.	
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a	small	and	fairly	unsystematic	piece	can	be	fit	into	the	puzzle	that	might	explain	the	
detected	variance	of	cluster	performance.
In	sum,	it	hitherto	can	be	stated	that	both	a	cluster’s	general	composition	and	its	open-
ness	respectively	its	degree	of	external	interconnectivity	in	terms	of	collaborations	and	
financial	flows	provide	a	certain,	but	not	yet	entirely	convincing,	contribution	towards	
explaining	their	differing	levels	of	performance.	We	cannot	make	any	blanket	statement	
on	how	and	to	what	extent	a	certain	relation	or	degree	of	interaction	contributes	to	a	clus-
ter’s	competitiveness.	For	this	reason,	the	following	section	turns	to	the	evolutionary	paths	
and	individual	trajectories	of	each	cluster	and	investigates	the	extent	to	which	a	cluster’s	
adjustment	abilities	correspond	to	its	success.	
4.3	eMpIrICal	results	II:	ConvergenCe	anD	aDaptabIlIty
When	we	address	the	convergence	hypothesis,	our	third	and	final	analytical	step	shows	
changes	and	movements	in	each	cluster’s	composition	over	time.	To	quantify	the	extent	
to	which	both	the	level	and	the	direction	of	change	are	related	to	a	cluster’s	performance,	
Table 4	lists	the	relative	cluster	composition	index	for	1996	and	2003	as	the	beginning	
and	the	end	points	in	our	investigation,	i.e.,	the	proportion	of	investors	to	basic	science	
institutions	standardized	by	the	national	average.	The	third	column	of	Table 4	depicts	the	
change	in	the	composition	from	1996	to	2003.	
With	a	change	of	55%,	the	Munich	area	has	undergone	the	strongest	structural	change	in	
cluster	composition,	followed	by	the	Ruhr	area	with	31%,	Rhine/Main	area	with	13%,	
and	Berlin	with	12%.	If	we	contrast	the	cluster	types	with	their	respective	performance,	
we	find	that	three	of	the	four	most	dynamic	clusters	are	the	ones	that	contain	the	largest	
number	of	biotechnology	firms.	Thus,	the	intensity	of	change	serves	as	an	indicator	of	the	
relationship	between	dynamics	and	success.	However,	the	intensity	of	change	does	not	
hold	for	the	Rhine/Main	area.
The	direction	of	change	represents	a	second	important	aspect	in	this	evolutionary	investi-
gation.	With	reference	to	the	results	of	the	cluster	composition	index,	Figure 5	tracks	the	
“movements”	of	the	cluster	between	1996	and	2003	in	respect	of	their	respective	config-
urations,	thus	clarifying	their	varying	evolutionary	paths:	While	the	clusters	Hamburg,	
Heidelberg,	Hanover,	and	Stuttgart,	which	have	a	well-balanced	composition	of	money	
and	ideas	in	1996,	remain	relatively	constant,	the	other	five	clusters	move	either	towards	
a	more	balanced	structure	(this	is	the	case	in	Munich,	the	Ruhr	area,	and	Berlin),	or	rein-
force	their	financial	or	scientific	dominance	(Rhine/Main	and	Göttingen).
9	 With	an	increase	of	2.8%,	the	national	average	remained	almost	stable.	In	1996,	research	institutes	in	biotech	
exceeded	biotech	investors	by	a	factor	of	4.24.	
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Table 4:  Relative cluster composition 1996 and 2003 compared
Cluster Composition Index*
Change Rate
1996 2003
Munich 0.386 0.597 55%
ruhrarea 0.437 0.572 31%
Berlin 1.890 1.675 12%
heidelberg 0.767 0.797 4%
Stuttgart 1.416 1.374 3%
hanover 0.885 0.879 -1%
hamburg 0.622 0.617 -1%
göttingen 2.950 3.274 -11%
rhine/Main 0.205 0.178 -13%
[outsidecluster] 2.161 2.164 0%
 Note:  * Proportion of basic science institutions to investors/VCs (weighted on national average)
By	connecting	these	paths	with	cluster	performance,	the	Rhine/Main	area	and	Göttingen	
suggest	that	a	movement	that	strengthens	the	orientation	of	a	cluster	is	negatively	related	
to	cluster	performance.	We	find	that	the	clusters	that	start	off	with	a	well-balanced	compo-
sition	and	more	or	less	keep	it	are	the	middle	field	players.	In	contrast,	the	outperforming	
clusters	are	those	three	that	move	from	dominant	compositions	towards	less	slanted	
composition.	Beginning	with	investor	dominance,	Munich	and	the	Ruhr	area	turn	to	a	
more	balanced	structure.	Remarkably,	both	clusters	undertook	the	most	dynamic	struc-
tural	shift	and	show	the	highest	relative	firm	growth	compared	to	the	other	clusters.	The	
German	capital	Berlin,	which	locates	the	largest	number	of	biotech	firms	over	the	whole	
period,	moved	from	its	science	orientation	in	1996	to	a	less	biased	composition.	
Figure 5:  High-performing movers vs. ‘captured’ colleagues: Types and dynamics in 
 German Biotech clusters
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The	exercise	of	tracking	the	starting	position	and	movement	of	clusters	appears	to	provide	
powerful	insights	in	explaining	cluster	performance.	Clusters	that	start	off	with	a	domi-
nant	orientation	and	dynamically	manage	to	change	toward	a	more	balanced	proportion	
of	capital	and	science	outperform	their	counterparts.	Hence,	the	dynamic	analysis	offers	
a	convincing	explanation	for	the	success	of	clusters.	
5 ConClusions
In	this	paper	we	address	the	evolution	of	nine	biotechnology	clusters	in	Germany	between	
1996	and	2003.	Three	different	approaches	were	tested	for	their	power	to	explain	the	
detected	heterogeneity	of	performance:	first,	a	cluster’s	composition	in	terms	of	the	extent	
to	which	it	hosts	science	and	capital;	second,	its	degree	of	openness	or,	in	other	words,	its	
external	linkages	to	institutions	located	outside	the	cluster;	and	third,	its	trajectories	and	
ability	to	adapt	its	configuration	over	time.	
Although	we	witnessed	the	interplay	of	varying	factors	as	well	as	a	critical	mass	precon-
dition	in	all	cases,	and	despite	being	aware	that	a	“catch-all”	recipe	that	explains	different	
levels	of	cluster	evolution	cannot	exist,	our	analysis	suggests	some	strong	regularities.	The	
first	two	ways	of	reasoning	provided	some,	but	not	convincing	help	to	further	our	under-
standing	of	cluster	performance.	Our	analysis	shows	that	it	is	not	possible	to	attribute	
a	certain	performance	level	to	a	certain	cluster	type.	The	analysis	of	interconnectivity	
provides	ambiguous	results.	Using	interorganizational	collaboration	as	one	means	of	inter-
connectivity,	we	find	that	clusters	in	which	firms	are	intensely	cooperating	with	both	for-
profit	and	nonprofit	firms	tend	to	be	more	successful.	In	terms	of	considering	financing	
flows	as	another	means	of	interconnectivity	within	and	between	clusters,	–	the	general	
interconnection	proves	to	be	an	important	factor	for	cluster	success.	However,	there	is	
no	evidence	on	the	characteristics	of	involvement	(e.g.,	receiving	versus	both	receiving	
and	giving).	That	is,	without	denying	their	general	significance	for	cluster	performance,	
external	linkages	do	not	help	to	systematically	explain	the	varying	success	of	clusters	in	
breeding	high-technology	firms.	
In	contrast,	the	dynamic	perspective	(i.e.,	the	view	that	addresses	the	extent	to	which	clus-
ters	are	able	to	change	their	composition	over	time	towards	a	less-slanted	structure	during	
the	period	of	investigation)	emerges	as	the	key	criterion	for	success.	Regardless	of	whether	
the	cluster	is	science	dominated	or	money	led,	those	clusters	that	manage	to	move	to	a	
more	balanced	composition	are	the	best	performing.	That	is,	after	a	cluster	has	taken	off	
and	established	itself	in	the	global	competition	of	innovative	locations,	the	crucial	task	is	
to	move	itself	towards	a	balanced	portfolio	of	science	and	capital.	This	result	directs	our	
attention	to	the	important	but	complex	task	of	investigating	the	factors	that	set	clusters	in	
motion	and	what	keeps	them	moving.	Our	primary	explorations	may	provide	an	avenue	
for	future	research	on	this	issue.	
However,	our	findings	also	have	immediate	implications	for	politics,	business	manage-
ment,	and	social	science.	In	political	and	managerial	terms,	the	constant	and	ongoing	
evaluation,	intervention	in,	and	direction	of	cluster	composition	appear	to	be	a	straight-
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forward	challenge.	The	turnover	and	renewal	of	cluster	composition	can	maintain	the	clus-
ters	as	successful	seedbeds	for	innovative	firms.	
Regarding	the	scientific	community,	when	considering	firm	and	cluster	performance,	our	
results	support	the	role	of	a	dynamic	approach	that	tracks	evolutionary	paths.	Hence,	
future	research	might	focus	on	the	extent	to	which	organizations,	institutions,	and	regions	
are	willing	to	rethink	themselves	and	to	undertake	the	necessary	structural	adjustments.	
Although	we	do	not	claim	to	have	identified	and	conceptualized	the	multilayered	mech-
anisms	underlying	such	movements,	or	to	have	answered	the	causality	question	(i.e.,	
to	what	extent	external	and	internal	interconnections	of	firms	impact	on	cluster	config-
uration	and	vice	versa)	in	comprehensive	manner,	our	hope	is	that	this	paper	stimulates	
further	explorations	that	will	enable	us	all	to	understand	the	ongoing	creative	ferment	in	
clusters	as	social	entities.	Succeeding	evolutionary	and	comparative	studies	that	inter	alia	
apply	a	more	differentiated	performance	measure,	such	as	firm	turnover	or	productivity,	
may	offer	fruitful	contributions	and	further	deepen	our	knowledge	on	the	interplay	of	
finance,	innovation,	and	space.	
Biotechnology
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Table A1: Governmental financial means granted to biotechnology firms, 1996-2003
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